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The establishment of the Karelian Workers’ Commune was much more a 
consequence of Bolshevik foreign and domestic policy (Realpolitik) than a result 
of Marxist theories or Leninist ideological principles. The Soviet system of the 
1920s was not so much a result of ideologically driven decision-making as it has 
some times been defined. This does not mean that ideology was irrelevant. But 
its role was rather a sort of matrix or model of decision-making than a decisive 
source of policy-making. The political need to stabilize the new Soviet state and 
to pacify the international situation forced the Bolsheviks to carry out a concilia-
tory policy toward their neighbors as well as toward national minorities and the 
peasants. In Karelia two decisive factors dominated: the political and military 
pressure of Finland and the general dissatisfaction of the Karelian population. 
Under those circumstances the Red Finns, emigrants from Finland in 1918, dom-
inated Karelia during its first fifteen years. Finnish-Karelian nationalism and the 
weakness of the central government were the two most important reasons why 
Karelia obtained politically and economically broader autonomy than any other 
autonomous region in the Soviet Union in the 1920s.
17
 
The Karelian question acquired a new dimension following the independence 
of Finland in 1917. In a general way Karelia had been a prominent subject of 
Finnish nationalism. The Kalevala, the Finnish national epic, was formed from 
poems collected in North Karelia (East Karelia from the Finnish point of view), 
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in the early nineteenth century. For Finnish national romantics the Kalevala and 
Karelia were especially significant symbols of ancient Finnish culture. The Kale-
vala made Finnish civilization comparable to other European cultures in its pos-
session of a national epic. The Kalevala located the golden age of the Finnish 
nation mostly in North Karelia. But Karelia had also been the source of ancient 
Russian epics, the bylinas. For this reason it has been in many ways the symbolic 
as well as physical battleground of Finnish and Russian nationalism.
18
 
The Red Finns living in Russia after Finland’s civil war of 1918 also shared 
this attitude to national identity. The short-lived socialist government, the Finn-
ish People’s Republic, and the new Soviet regime came to an agree-ment con-
cerning their new relationship in March 1918. The way they sought to settle the 
border between Finland and Soviet Russia was significant. The Finnish side saw 
the current line as historically unjust, separating the kindred peoples of Karelia 
and Finland. The parties agreed that the question could be quickly resolved by 
allowing the border to follow the national ethnic border of Karelia.
19
 The ethnic 
border of the Karelian and Russian population was, almost exactly, the Mur-
mansk railway line, Karelian to the West and Russian to the East of it. The new 
boundary was never realized because the Whites and the Germans defeated Red 
Finland. The White Government had the same demands over Karelia as the 
Reds, but border changes were not within the interests of the Soviet regime if 
they entailed concessions to Finnish conservatives. 
In the past Karelia had not been of any great importance for Russia until the 
moment the government built, with the help of Great Britain, the Murmansk 
railway through the region in 1916. When Russia lost Finland and the Baltic 
countries, it also lost its main ports on the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. 
The Baltic fleet was stationed at the port of Kronstadt without free passage to the 
sea. After this the Murmansk port was the only secure transport route from St. 
Petersburg to the open sea. The railway was also the reason for the intervention 
of Allied Forces in Murmansk. Neither the Soviet regime nor the Allies had a 
positive attitude to White Finland’s demands for Karelia because of the former 
Grand Duchy’s close alliance with Germany.20 
In 1918-22 Finnish White activists (a group of former German trained jae-
gers and right wing militants) attacked Soviet North Karelia three times as well 
as Olonets (South Karelia) and Estonia. In Karelia their aim was to annex the ar-
ea and in Estonia to fight the Red Army and secure benefits for Finland. The at-
tack on Estonia in spring 1919 was successful. General Laidoner, Admiral Kol-
chak, along with Finnish troops forced the Red Army to withdraw from Estonia. 
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At the same time General Charles Maynard attacked the Red Army from the 
north via the Murmansk railway. The international situation made the time seem 
ripe for an attack on St. Petersburg and Karelia. On the Finnish side, General C. 
G. E. Mannerheim and his General Staff drew up plans for the attack and the po-
litical arrangements to follow. It was at this time that Lenin realized that Petro-
grad would be conquered by White troops if the Finnish army joined forces with 
them. The Finnish activists believed that by conquering Olonets, Petrozavodsk, 
and Lodeine Pole, they could force the Finnish government, the Entente, and the 
White Russians to accept the conquests. For this reason, the “Olonets campaign” 
was also planned as a part of an impending attack on St. Petersburg. The Finns 
wanted to conquer it before the White Russians, who harbored hostility toward 
Finland’s independence, intervened. Ultimately the Finns were ready to carry out 
the attack without the support of the Western Powers.
21
 
The campaign began in April 1919. The Finnish government supported the 
volunteer troops, meeting most of the costs and providing political support. But 
the adverse attitude of the Olonets Karelians towards the Finnish “liberators” 
proved disappointing. The Red Army along with Red Finnish troops defeated the 
campaign in the summer of 1919. The failure of the campaign and the severe 
losses of the White Russians in the summer and autumn of 1919 also changed 
the international situation. The political circumstances in Finland changed as 
well. In July 1919 the moderate K. J. Ståhlberg was elected as the first president 
of Finland rather than General Mannerheim. Ståhlberg favored the Entente and 
objected to intervention in Russia. At the same time England and France also de-
cided to withdraw troops from Russia. They implied that they were no longer in-
terested in involvement in the internal affairs of Russia and that the Baltic states 
must arrange their relations with Soviet Russia themselves. Ståhlberg understood 
that this would also be the fate of Finland.
22
 
January 1920 marked a decisive turning point. The Entente had dropped its 
embargo, a fact which initiated a new stage in Soviet relations with the West. By 
February 1920 the Red Army had taken under its control the whole of Karelia 
excluding two districts (volosts), Repola and Porajärvi.
23
 
At this stage, in late 1919 or early 1920, Edvard Gylling drafted his proposal 
for a Karelian Workers’ Commune. He was a former member of the Finnish 
People’s Republic and its delegate to the negotiations with Soviet Russia in Feb-
ruary 1918. In late 1919 a young Finn, Erkki Veltheim, had visited Gylling in 
Stockholm and told him about his journey to Vardö in North Norway and to Ka-
relia. The report of this undergraduate philosophy student inspired Gylling. 
Clearing the Finnish Whites and the Intervention troops from Karelia in order to 
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establish Karelian-Finnish autonomy had long been on Gylling’s mind. Now he 
deemed the international situation ripe for it.
24
 
 
The idea of a Karelian workers’ commune 
Edvard Gylling sent his proposal for the autonomy of Karelia to V. I. Lenin 
through the chairman of the Communist Party of Finland, Yrjö Sirola. There had 
also been another plan related to Gylling’s. It was drawn up by the Commander-
in-Chief of the Red Finns in Sweden, Jussi Railo – the so-called Northern War 
Plan. According to this plan, Red Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian troops 
would attack Murmansk through North Finland, operate with the Red Army and 
Red Finns in clearing Murmansk and Karelia. In this way the idea of the Com-
mune of Karelia would come to fruition, and it would also plant the seed of the 
Northern Scandinavian revolution. Railo sent two of his trusted aides to Karelia 
for negotiations with Red Finns and Bolsheviks in mid-January 1920. The plan 
had no realistic chance of success which Gylling foresaw. The Central Police 
Bureau (the Finnish secret police) arrested both of the Red couriers in Finland in 
February 1921. The desperate Commander-in-Chief committed suicide in Janu-
ary. Edvard Gylling and Stockholm’s Bureau of the Communist Party of Finland 
ceased all military activities in Sweden. It was time to start to carry out Gylling’s 
political plan for Karelia.
25
 
After the formation of a new Finnish government on March 15, 1920, it be-
came possible on Finland’s part to start peace negotiations with Lenin’s govern-
ment. Peace with Soviet Russia was the central point of the government's foreign 
policy. On April 8 Narkomindel (the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) 
accepted the proposal for negotiations of Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti. Nego-
tiations started in Rajajoki (Sestra in Russian) four days later. The Western Pow-
ers had no interest in supporting the demands of Finland, and Russia had no rea-
son to negotiate the future of Karelia. For the first time the Soviet regime con-
trolled the situation in Karelia. On April 24, 1920 the Russian delegation left Ra-
jajoki, accusing the Finns of demanding too much.
26
 
One central disagreement had been Finland’s demand for a neutral demarca-
tion zone between the border of Finland and the Murmansk railway. From the 
Russian side it was an absolutely unacceptable demand. The statement of the 
Military Revolutionary Soviet was unambiguous. The defense of the Murmansk 
railway demanded the presence of the Red Army there. It pointed out that the 
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Finns had attacked the railway twice in recent years. The General Staff did not 
see any ethnographic or national reason for special arrangements in this area. It 
maintained that Finland had previously been a part of Russia’s strategic defense 
system, but now it had the capability to threaten the Kola peninsula and the 
Murmansk railway.
27
 
Only two days after the failed negotiations between Soviet Russia and Fin-
land, on April 26, Polish forces unexpectedly attacked Soviet Ukraine, and in 
May they captured Kiev. The Russians believed that this was a part of a larger 
intervention plan against them coordinated by the Foreign Minister of Great 
Britain, Lord Curzon. They thought that this was also the explanation for the in-
flexible attitude of Finland in the peace negotiations. In fact, Poland’s attack 
came as a surprise to Finland and Britain, although Russia did not believe this. 
She was afraid that Finland would join in the attack. Because of this fear, Russia 
was eager to neutralize Finland by opening negotiations again. Fortune had in-
tervened, and a new negotiation round started on May 11, 1920.
28
 
Gylling’s proposal for Karelia was translated for the Commissariat of For-
eign Affairs on March 24, 1920.
29
 He mentioned in his cover letter to Yrjö Sirola 
that he had worked out the proposal for the purposes of the Rajajoki peace nego-
tiations.
30
  
Gylling’s starting point was that the Commune should have national autono-
my led by Red Finns, form an integral economic unit, and serve as a base for 
revolution in Scandinavia. The Commune would consist of Karelia and the Kola 
Peninsula. It would have self-determination on internal matters, such as economy 
and education. In the sphere of social order, national economic questions, and 
defense policy, it would be a part of Soviet Russia like the “Commune of Petro-
grad.” Gylling also mentioned to Sirola the example of the Soviet Ukraine and 
the Northern Commune as examples of autonomous regions within the Soviet 
sphere. 
The national composition of the Commune should be half Russian and half 
Karelian. Gylling had noticed the “nationalistic bias” among the Karelian popu-
lation. For this reason a certain amount of Karelian nationalism and Finnish ide-
ology should be allowed “within permitted limits” in the Commune. He gave as-
surances that such a policy would eliminate the nationalistic agitation of Finland. 
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The coming revolution in Finland would acquire a particular national color, Gyl-
ling wrote. Tolerance for Karelian nationalism would also have a favorable ef-
fect on small farmers in Finland. Rural support had particular importance in the 
reasoning of Red Finns, because the lack of it had been one crucial reason why 
the Reds had failed in the Finnish civil war in 1918. 
For Gylling the establishment of the Commune was also one step towards the 
Scandinavian revolution. He stressed that in an economic and geographic way 
the Commune would be a part of Scandinavia. This relationship would encour-
age both legal and illegal communist work in Scandinavia. In addition, it would 
be possible to establish a Scandinavian Red Army regiment consisting of two 
thousand Swedish and Norwegian volunteers. Gylling believed that particularly 
northern Sweden and northern Norway were fertile ground for revolutionary and 
military work. The Finns would learn Soviet administrative practices and get 
military training in the Commune. 
Gylling’s final aim was to create an independent Soviet Republic of Scandi-
navia. It would be possible to carry out the Scandinavian revolution separately 
from the West European revolution, Gylling argued. He believed that Red Scan-
dinavia, which was surrounded by Soviet Russia, had no reason to be afraid of 
intervention. On the contrary it would have an enormous effect on Western Eu-
rope. In addition, it would be able to keep European timber production under its 
control. Gylling further proposed that the leaders of the Commune should be 
firm supporters of national autonomy. This was indispensable in order to prevent 
the growth of Karelian separatism. Events developed in a fruitful direction from 
Gylling’s point of view.  
 
The eve of the Dorpat peace negotiations. 
After Poland attacked Ukraine, the Soviet leadership believed that the situa-
tion was worse than it really was. To address the situation in Karelia, it invited 
Gylling to Moscow in late April 1920.
31
 Lenin wanted to talk with him about the 
Karelian question directly. The reason was evident. Chicherin had alerted the 
party leader of Petrograd, Grigori Zinoviev, about the situation in Karelia al-
ready on March 19, 1920. This was at the time that the Soviet government was 
preparing for the Rajajoki peace negotiations. “White Finns spread their propa-
ganda among the Karelians, but we cannot do anything.” Chicherin warned that 
an anti-Soviet mood was widespread among the population.  
After the Rajajoki negotiations were broken off, Chicherin informed Zino-
viev that they were working to make contacts with Finnish politicians who were 
not aiming at an alliance with Poland. Chicherin connected this task to the solu-
tion of the Karelia question. He had noticed that “the idea of the self-
determination of Karelia is particularly popular in the circles of well known 
Finnish politicians.” Chicherin reminded Zinoviev that the area was of enormous 
importance for Russia, and for this reason it was imperative to find a solution 
which the Karelians would accept. He added that it was necessary to find the 
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same kind of autonomous solution with which they already had good experience 
in other national areas. Chicherin urged Zinoviev to send some comrades to Ka-
relia who knew local conditions and could examine the situation.
32
 
The right people for the job could be found in Petrograd: Finnish emigres, 
among them a former Social Democrat member of parliament and small farmer 
Jaakko Mäki. Mäki confirmed in his report that the Russians were not able to 
stabilize the Soviet regime in Northern Karelia. “The Russian propagandists are 
not able to do their work among the Onega Karelians, and sometimes they say 
that the attitude of the population is hostile to Soviet power.” He recommended 
that communists be sent to North Karelia who knew the Finnish or Karelian lan-
guage. Another crucial task was to improve the living conditions of the popula-
tion. It was especially important to take into account the language question and 
to establish Finnish newspapers and schools in North Karelia.
33
 The political sit-
uation was under the control of neither Soviet nor any other authorities, and the 
Onega Karelians resisted more or less all external attempts to control their areas.  
The other agency working in Karelia was the The Executive Committee (EC) 
of Olonets uezd. It was a tool of the Petrograd party committee and received its 
directives from Smolny. The EC of Olonets uezd represented official Soviet 
power in Karelia, but it lacked influence over most of northern Karelia. However 
limited its control, the EC had elected the organizational committee to prepare 
for the first assembly of the All-Karelian Congress of Soviets. This organization-
al committee held its first meeting on April 23, 1920, the day before the Soviet 
delegation walked out of the Rajajoki negotiations.
34
  
The EC of Olonets then asked the Revolutionary Committee of Petrograd 
whether it was appropriate to convene an All-Karelian Congress of Soviets in 
order to express Karelian opinion about the fate of Karelia. A question of partic-
ular importance was the appearance of the Uhtua government
35
 which had de-
clared the willingness of the Karelian people to join with Finland. The Olonets 
committee pointed out the fact that the majority of Karelians lived in the Olonets 
uezd and less than one third in the area claimed by the Uhtua government. The 
Olonets Committee got Petrograd's permission to act, and on May 3, it an-
nounced that the All-Karelian Congress of Soviets would be held on July 1, 
1920.
36
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Those events proved that the Soviet authorities pursued two different lines 
concerning the Karelia question. One was the policy of the Commissariat for In-
ternal Affairs. It operated in conjunction with the Olonets EC. Another belonged 
to Narkomindel and a section of the political leadership. The latter had started 
preparations to carry out Gylling’s plan for autonomy. The decision was made at 
the beginning of May, probably as part of the process which led to Russia’s pro-
posing the Dorpat (Iurevskii, Tartu) peace negotiations on May 11. On May 18 
the VKP(b) Politburo assembled in Moscow. The Bolshevik leadership was in 
attendance: Lenin, Nikolai Krestinsky, Iosif Stalin, Lev Kamenev, and Lev Trot-
sky. They agreed on the formation of a committee to prepare a proposal on the 
Commune of Karelia. The convener was to be the Deputy Commissar of Internal 
Affairs, M. F. Vladimirsk, and the members were to consist of L. M. Karakhan 
from Narkomindel, representatives from “comrades of Finland and Petroza-
vodsk,” and the representative of the German Workers’ Commune.37 The deci-
sion regarding the Karelian Commune had been made taking foreign policy into 
account and after that decisions on the Karelian question were made on the basis 
of foreign policy. Another important consequence of this decision was that the 
EC of Olonets and Petrograd were ignored and the seeds of rivalry between Red 
Finns backed by Moscow and the EC of Olonets backed by Petrograd were 
sown.  
On May 23, 1920 Narkomindel sent a note to the Foreign Ministry of Fin-
land. It stated that the Red Army had occupied North Karelia, the military posi-
tion was immutable, and that the Soviet authorities had started to set up autono-
my for the Karelian people. The Uhtua government had fled to Finland, and the 
region was under the control of Soviet organs.
38
 
In this situation it was understandable that the NKVD and the Red Army 
were not very positive about the idea of autonomy. Lev Trotsky’s deputy, the 
People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs I. M. Skliansk, asked for an 
explanation of the plans for the Karelian Commune on May 24, 1920. Narko-
mindel assured Skliansk that this solution, by satisfying the demands of the pop-
ulation and calming the situation, was the best way to secure Soviet interests in 
Karelia.
39
 Three days later, on May 27, the committee had done its work and 
Narkomindel and Yrjö Sirola, chairman of the Communist Party of Finland, ap-
proved Vladimirsk’s resolution. It was ready for presentation to the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee (VTsIK).
40
  
Finland accepted the Soviet offer of peace negotiations on the same day. The 
peace negotiations in Dorpat would start on June 10, 1920. Soviet authorities 
had a busy timetable. They had to sort out the Karelia issue prior to the Dorpat 
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negotiations. The Politburo accepted Gylling’s proposal on Karelia on June 1.41 
But all was not smooth sailing. 
In spite of what happened in Moscow, the Petrograd-Olonets party acted on 
its own. The Provincial Committee of Olonets held a congress on May 25-28. It 
elected its own committee to sort out the Karelia question. One of its members 
was Vasili M. Kudzhiev, secretary of the Olonets party organization and member 
of the Olonets organization committee for the All-Karelian Congress.
42
 As a re-
sult two separate Soviet organizations intended to settle the Karelian question in 
their own way. 
On June 2 this new Olonets committee officially convened the All-Karelian 
Congress of Soviets to be held in Petrozavodsk from July 1-3, 1920. The timing 
deserves special attention. It is clear that the party organization of Petrograd and 
at least Zinoviev were aware of the decision of the Politburo (June 1) and the 
work of Vladimirsk’s committee. The committee’s resolution had been taken on 
May 27 and the discussions of the content of the resolution were hardly unknown 
to Zinoviev.  In the resolution the organization to be established was named the 
Revolutionary Committee of Karelia and five unspecified persons were to be ap-
pointed to it: two Finnish communists, one member of the Military Soviet of the 
7th Red Army (in Karelia), one from Karelia’s Russian population, and one from 
Karelia’s Finnish population.43 
The Politburo disagreed with this composition. It gave the task of making a 
proposal on the Karelian Committee to the administrative bureau of the Central 
Committee (Orgburo) together with Zinoviev (Petrograd), Chicherin (Narkomin-
del) and Vladimirsk (NKVD). The result was that only one member of the five – 
Kudzhiev – from the competing Olonets committee was nominated to the  Com-
mittee of Karelia one week later. The Finnish members were Gylling and the be-
fore mentioned Jaakko Mäki.
44
 The activities of the Olonets committee provide 
clear evidence that there was disagreement over the composition of the Karelian 
(Revolutionary) Committee. The clash of the competing institutions and their in-
terests were crystallizing in the nomination process and parallel, but contradicto-
ry activities of the Moscow based and Petrograd based organizations. 
There were now two competing committees in Karelia, one apponted by the 
Orgburo and one appointed by the Olonets party leadership. It is evident that the 
organization committee of Olonets had taken the initiative because it (and/or the 
leading personnel in Petrograd) knew of the coming resolution and composition 
of the Karelian Committee. A great deal of evidence supports this conclusion. 
At first, on June 7, 1920 VTsIK decided that the convener of the All-
Karelian Congress of Soviets should be the Karelian Revkom headed by Gylling. 
                         
41. Ocherki istorii Karelskoi organizatsii KPSS (Petrozavodsk: Izdatel’stvo “Kareliia,” 1974), 
p. 143; Churchill, Itä-Karjalan kohtalo 1917-1922, p. 180. 
42. Ocherki istorii Karelskoi organizatsii KPSS, pp. 138-39. 
43. Doklad o sozdanii Karelskoi Trudovoi Kommuny 1920. AVPRF, f. 135, op. 4, p. 6, d. 24, l. 
7; Organizatsionogo Biuro po sozyvu sezda Severea 2.6.1920. The above dela, l. 14; Ocherki istorii 
Karelskoi organizatsii KPSS, p. 142. 
44. Minutes of Politburo 1.6.1920. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 85, l. 2. 
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The two other members at least nominated to the Revkom were Mäki and 
Kudzhiev.
45
 The situation was unclear after two weeks. The Revkom which had 
the authorization of Moscow traveled from Petrograd to North Karelia to Kemi 
in order to look for a suitable capital for the Commune. While the Revkom was 
on the road, the Olonets organizational committee continued to prepare for the 
All-Karelian Congress which was actually a matter for the Revkom of Gylling to 
arrange. The institutional and political struggle within the Soviet leadership was 
mirrored in Karelia. The Revkom, led by Gylling and nominated by the VKP(b) 
Orgburo competed with the Olonets organizational committee led by Kudzhiev 
and supported by the Petrograd party oraganizations.  
Events thus went forward on two tracks. The Olonets EC next named its own 
leadership for the All-Karelian Congress, disregarding the activities of Gylling’s 
Revkom. Information about the activity of the Olonets EC was wired to Narko-
mindel by the Olonets Provincial Cheka on June 13, 1920. Narkomindel got 
nervous. It wired to Vladimirsk, deputy head of NKVD, and demanded that he 
put his employees in order. As a result of this, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs 
Chicherin himself wired strict orders to the Olonets Cheka on the next day. He 
announced that only Gylling and his Revkom had the right to assemble the Con-
gress of the Karelian Workers’ Commune.46 Narkomidel was committed to the 
“Gylling-Vladimirsk” plan for Karelian autonomy and saw that its realization 
was a key factor in reaching positive results in the ongoing Dorpat peace negoti-
ations with Finland. Moscow did not have the slightest intention of letting locals 
confuse its diplomatic maneuvers. 
After all this, on June 20 Gylling’s Revkom published an announcement in 
which it confirmed the acts of the Olonets organization committee. It was too 
late to cancel the Congress, but its function was changed. The Revkom an-
nounced that the Congress would be the preparatory conference of the forthcom-
ing Congress of the Workers' Commune of Karelia.
47
 In this way the Revkom 
endeavored to get the situation under its control. 
On what basis was it decided to establish the Commune? To find out we have 
to take the resolution of Vladimirsk as our starting point. It was agreed to by the 
Politburo, it was the basic material for the VTsIK decision, and apart from the 
proposal of Gylling, it is the only substantial document concerning the estab-
lishment of the Karelian Workers’ Commune.  
The main motive for the formation of the Karelian Workers’ Commune was 
the threat of Finland. Vladimirsk’s first argument was that the Commune needed 
                         
45. Doklad o sozdanii Karelskoi Trudovoi Kommuny 1920. AVPRF, f. 135, op. 4, p. 6, d. 24, l. 
7; Yleisvenäläisen Neuvostojen Toimeenpanevan Keskuskomitean Dekreetti Karjalan Työkansan 
Kommuunin perustamisesta 7.6.1920. In Punainen Karjala. K.A.S.N.T:n Oikeusasian K.K 
Petroskoi 1925. 
46. Narkomindel 13.6.20 Vladimirskomu. AVPRF, f. 135, 1920 g., op. 4, p. 6, d. 19, l. 23; 
Narkomindel 13.6.20 v Prezidium VTsK t. Ksenofontovu. The above dela, l. 22; Narkomindel 
Chicherin 14.6.20 Kapperu Olonetskaia Gubcheka. The above dela, l. 24. 
47. Karjalan Vallankumouskomitean määräys edustajakokouksen koollekutsumisesta ja 
edustajien valitsemisesta. Olonetsaia Kommuna,  N:o 136, 20.6.1920 and N:o 137, 21.6.1920. 
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to be established in order to prevent the annexationist endeavors of Finland. It 
was also needed as a bulwark against Karelian nationalism which Finnish activ-
ists had made skillful use of. Vladimirsk pointed to the government of Uhtua in 
this regard. The second purpose was to improve the living standard of the Kare-
lian people and the economy of the area. The third purpose was to create in Ka-
relia a base for revolutionary propaganda to be disseminated in Finland and 
Scandinavia.  
Gylling’s purpose had been, and this was in accord with Vladimirsk’s resolu-
tion, that the Commune of Karelia would consist of the Finnish Kola peninsula 
(Aleksandrovsky uezd), and the majority of Olonets and Arkhangelsk provinces 
including Petrozavodsk. But until the Congress of the Karelian Workers’ Com-
mune assembled and sorted out the constitution of Karelia, the region would 
consist of the areas of Olonets and Arkhangelsk provinces. As a result of this ar-
rangement, the majority of the region’s population was Karelian (60 percent). 
The Soviet authorities (VTsIK June 8, 1920) had established real national au-
tonomy a few days before the Dorpat peace negotiations started two days late on 
June 12, 1920. But as we shall see later, this temporary arrangement was also the 
source of contradictions. 
As a consequence of the area’s national character, the Finnish party organiza-
tions in Russia (the Central Buro) obtained a leading role parallel to that of the 
Bolsheviks in Karelia. The role of language in culture and administration was 
not clearly defined. It was decided that Finnish newspapers would be estab-
lished. Also Finnish schools, a college of education, libraries and reading-rooms 
would be opened. Military matters received a great deal of attention. It was 
planned that a Scandinavian international Red Army unit would be established 
consisting of about 2,000 men. This was for the coming revolution in Scandina-
via, the prospects of which Gylling had outlined in his proposal. The Finnish 
Central Buro and the Military Soviet of the 7th Red (Finnish) Army were or-
dered to implement formation of this unit.
48
 
The central feature of the arrangement was that the establishment of autono-
my was motivated by the coming peace negotiations in Dorpat. Chicherin had 
reached the conclusion that the negotiations had no possibility of success without 
resolving the issue of Karelia. The NKVD was not really in favor of autonomy, 
and Trotsky’s Red Army was also suspicious of the matter. There were two main 
strategies as to how to keep Karelia under Soviet control. The first one was the 
line of power from the Commissariats to Petrograd and to Olonets. Its efforts 
were focused on the Soviet organizations in Petrozavodsk headed by Russians. 
The second one was much more skillful. Perhaps it is possible to say that it 
represented a “Leninist nationalities policy,” although the initiative was Gyl-
ling’s. The central agents of this were Narkomindel and at least the majority of 
the Politburo. The third line was Gylling’s which was compatible with Moscow’s 
policy. His idea of autonomy was still wider than that of Narkomindel. The dif-
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ferent approaches emerged later at the time that the Karelian Workers’ Com-
mune started to organize its economy and administration. 
 
In Dorpat 
The Dorpat peace negotiations beagan on June 12, 1920. The Soviet delega-
tion had gained an advantage after the establishment of the Karelian Workers’ 
Commune. Following initial discussions the negotiations did not advance until 
the Red Army defeated Poland in July. This event, along with the Soviet-Lettish 
(12.7.1920) and Soviet-Lithuanian (11.8.1920) peace agreements, undermined 
Finland’s position. She gave in ceasing to demand a referendum on the self-
determination of East Karelia and finally ceded Repola and Porajärvi, which 
were still under her control. The only area Finland finally obtained was Petsamo, 
which had been promised to her by Alexander II in 1864. The Dorpat Peace was 
signed on October 14, 1920.
49
 
Once Finland ceased to put forward the question of independence (in reality 
the uniting to Finland) of East Karelia, the issue became what would be the legal 
status of Karelian Autonomy. Finland wanted it to be agreed to by a peace treaty, 
but Russia was not ready for this. Her position was that Karelia was an internal 
Russian issue. As a compromise Russia accepted that it would deliver a procla-
mation on the autonomy of East Karelia, agreeing to include it in the peace trea-
ty. It was the last obstacle in the way of the treaty. Chicherin invited Gylling to 
draw up the announcement. The final version of it was completed on September 
21. There was not a word about the Karelian Workers’ Commune, but rather 
about East Karelia. The Russians’ interpretation was that this meant the same 
thing. Although Finland refused to recognize Gylling’s Commune, her interpreta-
tion was that she had obtained the right to oversee how self-determination was 
put into practice.
50
 
This stage of the negotiations was decisive for the essence of Karelian auton-
omy. As a result of Finnish demands for broader autonomy and an international 
basis for a solution, Russia was forced to specify and expand the sphere of the 
self-determination of Karelia. This was needed to prevent Finnish demands for 
calling an international conference to draw up an agreement on the self-
determination of Karelia. Chicherin stressed in his letter to the Politburo on Sep-
tember 6 that it was absolutely imperative to prevent Finland’s interference over 
Karelia because of the Murmansk railway. For this reason Chicherin asked the 
Central Committee to authorize Gylling and Narkomindel together to draw up 
the text of the declaration on the autonomy of East Karelia.
51
 
Two principle questions needed to be resolved. The first was the fate of the 
EC of Olonets Province in Petrozavodsk which was a parallel organ to Gylling’s 
Revkom. The Finnish press criticized the ambiguous situation which was an em-
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barrassment to Narkomindel. The second question concerned the degree to 
which Karelia would control her own economic development. As a consequence 
of the objections of the Olonets EC, the Supreme Council of the National Econ-
omy (VSNKh) had decided that the rights of the Soviet organs, i.e., those tied to 
the Center in Karelia, were to parallel the regional ones. Gylling was strictly op-
posed to this kind of weakening of autonomy. He demanded the establishment of 
special economic organs in Karelia. Chicherin backed him, reminding that the 
issue of Karelian autonomy was tied to Soviet-Finnish relations. As a result 
VTsIK passed a declaration on Karelia on September 22, one day after the Dor-
pat declaration on Karelia was agreed to. It promised that Karelia would get 
competent organs for broad and free self-determination. The object of the mes-
sage was clear which was not a surprise taking into consideration the role of Gyl-
ling in the process.
52
 
Although the announcement of the Soviet delegation was a loss from Fin-
land’s point of view, it was still more important for Karelian autonomy than has 
previously been realized.
53
 Gylling affirmed that it was just that announcement 
which defined the content and breadth of autonomy. He appreciated its signifi-
cance. It had guaranteed for Karelia complete self-determination with regard to 
its economy, language and cultural policy, legislation, and legal system. The op-
timistic opinion of Gylling was that the breadth of autonomy was sufficient for 
half a century.
54
 Although Gylling’s optimism was not based on firm ground, Ka-
relian autonomy was unique compared to that of other Soviet autonomous re-
gions in the 1920s.  
Gylling looked on Karelia mainly as a question of nationality policy, and less 
a question of class struggle. He compared the Karelian issue to the Bolshevik 
policy among the “Eastern nations” of Soviet Russia where the first task was na-
tional and cultural emancipation of Muslim nations – not a class struggle as in 
the European part of Russia. It is worth noting that when Gylling described the 
Commune at the conference of the Finnish Communist Party (FCP) one year lat-
er, he used the words “separate from Russia” and “broad self-determination.” He 
thought that in the future Karelia would separate from Russia in order to join its 
natural economic and national region in the formation of the Scandinavian Sovi-
et Republic.
55
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True autonomy or a diplomatic maneuver? 
After the Dorpat peace agreement, the struggle moved to the local level 
where it crystallized in a disagreement between Gylling and Kudzhiev. There 
were two factions in Karelia. They divided over how much Karelia was part of 
Russia and how broad was its right to national (Karelian-Finnish) self-
determination. The pro-Russian faction was concentrated in the party and admin-
istrative organs of Olonets. At the head of them stood the Karelian party secre-
tary Kudzhiev. 
Gylling was the leader of the national-communists. He declared openly that 
his policy was nationalistic. The consequences of Russification had to be re-
versed by a policy of Finnicization. He anticipated being accused of nationalistic 
tendencies. He stated that “the claim that my policy is nationalistic is correct. 
However, the point is that this nationalism is useful to the purposes of the revolu-
tion.”56 
Kudzhiev and his supporters held that autonomy had been implemented only 
because of the peace negotiations at Dorpat. Once they were over there was no 
need to keep broad autonomy alive. Kudzhiev claimed that the Finnicization pol-
icy benefited only the efforts of the White Finns to conquer Karelia. He was sure 
that it would divide the Karelian population along the line of South (Olonets gu-
berniia) and North Karelia (Onega Karelians). In fact, he was not totally wrong 
on this point. The Petrograd Party organization (Grigori Zinoviev) and the ma-
jority of the FCP leadership agreed with his position.
57
 
In autumn 1920 the Industrial Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of 
Karelia, which at this stage consisted solely of Finnish red emigres, started to 
make plans for the implementation of economic self-determination. The issue 
centered on who would make decisions for Karelia: the EC of Olonets, the cen-
tral organs, or the Revkom. 
In principle, a solution was reached in accordance with the proposal of the 
Red Finns and the Revkom. In September 1920 the Commune obtained a Coun-
cil of National Economy headed by Gylling. It was the competent organ for 
broad and free self-determination that was promised in the declaration of VTsIK 
on September 22, 1920. In April 1921, as a part of NEP policy, Karelia obtained 
exceptionally broad economic autonomy with special budgetary rights. This was 
partly thanks to the activities of Gylling and his direct contacts with Lenin, and 
partly thanks to changed political circumstances.
58
 Gylling’s timing was perfect. 
Still, there was a great difference between the decisions made in Moscow and 
practice as implemented in Karelia. In 1921 political tension increased in Kare-
lia. Kudzhiev and the administration of Olonets were strongly opposed to Gyl-
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ling’s policies. In addition there was a famine in North Karelia which was in any 
case the most pro-Finnish and anti-Soviet region of Karelia. The famine also 
caused serious problems in Petrozavodsk in the spring and summer of 1921. 
Even the workers of the Onega Plant joined the citizens demonstrating in the 
streets demanding bread. They threatened to attack Soviet functionaries if they 
could not supply bread. Karelia was granted credit from Moscow, bought bread; 
and the situation was calmed for a while. In the autumn the circumstances again 
deteriorated. Karelia requested bread from Moscow, but without results. In Oc-
tober Petrozavodsk sent a despairing wire to Moscow. If they could not supply 
bread and grain immediately, many people in North Karelia would die by next 
spring.
59
 
 
The insurrection and the attempted revolution 
At the same time Finnish White activists organized another insurrection in 
Viena (North Karelia). The most effective weapon was bread or the lack thereof. 
Activists promised bread for the villages if they would join Finland and establish 
a civil guard. In this way the insurgents occupied a broader area in North Karelia 
than the former Uhtua government had controlled. Their aim was to force the 
government of Finland to support them; to unite East Karelia, or at least Repola 
and Porajärvi to Finland; and to open up for international discussion the question 
of the paragraphs dealing with Karelia in the Dorpat peace treaty. Foreign Minis-
ter Holsti made a proposal to Narkomindel suggesting new negotiations on the 
Karelia issue. Finland also appealed to the League of Nations; this time in order 
to get international support for her aims in Karelia.
60
 
The events acted as a warning bell to Chicherin. On December 2, 1921 he 
sent a letter to the Politburo proposing immediate and direct action to suppress 
the rebellion. He also demanded that the Cheka should be mobilized and a show 
of military strength should be made on the borders of Finland. Chicherin was 
convinced that the League of Nations would support Finland in the matter. For 
this reason it was imperative to suppress the insurrection before the League of 
Nations could intervene. Lenin and Trotsky agreed with him.
61
 
The Soviet government responded in two ways. By late December the Red 
Army built up units on the border which made the Finnish Foreign Minister 
nervous. The Cheka had also begun to move into action. Its own man, the Finn 
Eino Rahja,
62
 was the head of the military organization of the FCP. He and the 
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secretary of the Central Committee of the FCP had drawn up a plan for armed 
revolution in Finland in early December, probably immediately after the meeting 
of the Politburo.
63
 The plan was based on an anticipated war between Russia and 
Finland. The party would start revolutionary agitation in Finland and enlist the 
former Red army-men (the Murmansk legion) and the unemployed of North Fin-
land. The Finns asked the VKP(b) for weapons, ammunition, other military 
equipment, and approval for the operation. The secretariat of the VKP(b) and 
Trotsky accepted the plan on December 16 and the central committee (CC) con-
firmed it on December 21. In addition, Trotsky ordered about 300 Finnish Red 
Army officer candiates to fight the rebellion in North Karelia. Rahja was ap-
pointed to the Revolutionary Military Council of Petrograd in early 1922. He is 
the only Finn who received this “honor”.64 
This was the pre-history of the attempted armed revolution, the so-called 
Läskikapina in Finnish Lapland. It started on February 2, 1922; and it was led by 
Juuso Matero and other Finnish Red Army men from Russia. The commander-
in-chief was Eino Rahja, who remained in Petrozavodsk. Before this, Narkomin-
del had threatened the Foreign Ministry of Finland that if Finland continued the 
attack it would leave the Karelia issue in the hands of the Red Army. A few days 
before the Läskikapina, the rebel forces in North Karelia were defeated by Finn-
ish Red officer candidates, led by Toivo Antikainen. Some attacks were also 
made on Finland’s side by regular units. The Läskikapina lasted five days. After 
this 283 lumberjacks along with their wives and children fled to Soviet Karelia. 
As Juuso Matero said one month later, they had to give up for two reasons: there 
were too few of them taking up arms because the workers did not rise in rebel-
lion; and war did not break out. 
It is obvious that the attempted revolution was one of a series which the 
Communist International (Comintern) and its head Zinoviev backed in Berlin, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and lastly in Tallinn in 1924. Trotsky and the Cheka were al-
so involved in it. At the same time Narkomindel carried out a different policy. It 
pursued détente in Europe. Afterwards Chicherin claimed in a letter to Trotsky 
that with the Läskikapina the Finnish communists had posed a threat to Russia’s 
foreign policy and the success of the Genoa Conference
65
 
This statement and the evidence that we have from the archives of AVP RF, 
the Foreign Ministry of Finland and RGASPI indicate that there were at least 
three agencies carrying out their own policies. The common aim of all of them 
was to suppress the rebellion as quickly as possible. The main effort of Narko-
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mindel was to achieve this as diplomatically as possible. For Narkomindel, mili-
tary force was subordinate to diplomacy.  
The second group was Trotsky, Zinoviev, and the hard core of the VKP(b) 
including Viacheslav Molotov and Maxim Litvinov. They were eager to use the 
situation to organize an armed revolution in Finland. It is not possible to say how 
much this was a part of general Soviet policy and to what extent it was their own.  
The third group was the Cheka, the Red Army, and the militant leaders of the 
FCP. The more moderate leaders of the FCP were excluded from the plan. Rahja 
and his aides believed that war would break out which would offer them the per-
fect opportunity for armed revolution. This was the only way they thought it was 
possible for revolution to succeed in Finland. They drew up their last plan for in-
surrection in January 1924. It was voted down in the CC of the FCP.  
The real aim of the Cheka was not clear. Was it using the FCP and Rahja to 
organize a defensive attack in the rear of the rebels? Or did it really envisage an 
attempt at armed revolution? The evidence indicates that it probably sought both 
aims: the minimum aim which was a defensive attack in the rear of the rebels and 
the maximum aim which was an armed revolution.
66
 
 
The Finnicization of Karelia 
After the suppression of the rebellion, it was time to resolve the contradic-
tions in Petrozavodsk. The insurrection had indicated that there was a basis for 
Gylling’s criticisms of the uncertainty surrounding Karelian autonomy. In the au-
tumn of 1921 just before the rebellion, he and Otto Ville Kuusinen had threat-
ened in a letter to the CC of VKP(b) that Finns would leave Karelia if they were 
not granted undisputed authority to lead the area. They criticized the Russian 
majority party organization in Karelia that it did not understand and did not want 
to accept national self-determination.
67
 
Three main issues were responsible for the contradictions in Karelia
68
: 
1) Did Karelia enjoy true autonomy or was it only a diplomatic maneuver? 
The Finns demanded that economic self-determination be implemented as well 
since administrative organization without real economic power was nonsense. 
2) Did Karelia have national autonomy? The Finns demanded that the Finn-
ish language be adopted in ethnically Karelian districts for administrative pur-
poses and that it be adopted as the language of instruction in national schools. 
3) How much authority to administer Karelia would reside in Petrozavodsk?  
What was the nature of the decisions concerning the power of the center? Had 
they been made solely as a diplomatic maneuver or was the intention to imple-
ment them?  
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Gylling demanded that: 
a) the budget for Finnish-language public education had to be increased and 
had to represent up to one-third of the whole budget 
b) the number of Finnish communists had to be increased and their leading 
role guaranteed 
c) the Karelian Workers’ Commune had to be granted the status of a Soviet 
Republic 
The Orgburo of the CC was summoned to deal with the issue of Karelia. 
Edvard Gylling gave an account of the political situation. Also present were the 
Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of CC, Ivan Smirnov, and the Karelian Party 
Secretary Kudzhiev. Stalin and Molotov were the leading figures in the Orgburo. 
It was Stalin’s view that decided the matter in Gylling’s favor. The only proposal 
Gylling made which was not accepted was to grant Karelia the status of a Soviet 
Republic. All the other issues mentioned above were resolved according to the 
position of the Finns.
69
 
In the aftermath, Adolf Taimi,
70
 the Finnish member of the Northwest Bureau 
and the EC of the Comintern, claimed that Gylling had misled Stalin, who was 
inclined to support Gylling’s nationalistic ideas “because of false information . . . 
because he trusted our capability and judgment too much.” Taimi claimed that 
Gylling represented those powers which sought to establish a “Greater Finland” 
and separate Karelia from Russia.
71
 Here is another example of the disagreement 
among the Bolsheviks about the essence of the Soviet Union (autonomy vs. a 
federation of republics) and expectations of revolutionary developments in Eu-
rope. Among the Red Finns the disagreement focused on the position of Finno-
Ugric nations in Russia after the revolution. From this standpoint the accusations 
of Adolf Taimi were “right” and disagreement between his and Gylling’s politi-
cal opinion real.  
After the session of the Orgburo, it was time to purge the Northwest Bureau 
which had backed the opponents of Gylling and the Karelian party organization. 
Ivan Smirnov, secretary of the Northwest Bureau, was replaced by Boris Bozern, 
an aide of Stalin. Stalin was present at the session of the Bureau in order to se-
cure the right decision. In March, immediately after the session of the Orgburo, 
the party secretary of Karelia, Vasili Kudzhiev, was replaced by the Finn, Johan 
Järvisalo, a supporter of Gylling. In Karelia the united Provincial Committee of 
the Party organization was established to replace the Revkom and the Olonets 
party organization. The Karelia-Olonets party organization had earlier handed 
out a party reprimand to Gylling and Mäki for proposing this same solution.
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Those decisions constituted an important success for the Finns, who also ac-
quired control of the party organization of Karelia. The remaining question was 
the area to comprise Karelia and its administrative organs. The final blow against 
the opponents of the Commune was the decision to liquidate the Olonets guber-
niia and its administrative organs. The VTsIK made this resolution on Septem-
ber 18, 1922.
73
 
The only reversal in autonomy, but still a significant one, was the final deci-
sion over Karelia’s borders. In 1920 the population of Karelia was 60 percent 
Karelian and Finnish, but the new arrangements created a different situation. In 
1924 Moscow decided to incorporate new Russian majority districts into the re-
gion against the will of the Karelian leaders. The titular Karelian nation became 
a minority as the new districts increased the size of the Russian population to 
55.7 percent. Those regional arrangements in Karelia were part of a broader So-
viet administrative reform.
74
  
The process of creating the borders of the Commune of Karelia was not a 
consistent one. The general line of Soviet Russia was to create administrative 
borders on the basis of economics. National autonomies were exceptional cases. 
The Soviet regime sometimes took into consideration the national configuration 
of a region. The case of Karelia was itself an exception to these exceptional cas-
es. It was too small (about 100,000 people), too scattered, and too underdevel-
oped to be a real nation in the sense in which, for example, Stalin had defined 
the features of a nation. It did not have either a distinct, uniform national charac-
ter, language, or cultural orientation. On the whole, the arrangements in Karelia 
followed the general line of Soviet politics based on economics; and Gylling, 
having a good understanding of economics, understood this.  He did not there-
fore oppose the territorial arrangements as fiercely as some other national mind-
ed Red Finns. For Gylling, both a viable economy and the balance between the 
Russian and non-Russian national populations were essential preconditions for 
Karelian autonomy. 
In sum, we can confirm that the most important reasons for creating the au-
tonomous Karelian Workers’ Commune consisted of the following: the existence 
of the strategic Murmansk railway, the proximity of the region to Finland with its 
national dimension, and the Dorpat Peace Agreement in 1920. If Russia wanted 
to preserve a peaceful settlement of the northwest border after the civil war, it 
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had to give autonomy to the Karelian people and abide by the decisions of the 
Treaty of Dorpat on East Karelian autonomy.  
The domestic situation was more complicated. Contradictions were sharp 
both among the central authorities and among the locals in Karelia. Leningrad 
party leader and Politburo member Grigori Zinoviev represented a common “an-
ti-nationalities” or “internationalist” line which did not pay much attention to the 
intentions of minority nations whether it was a question of Ukraine or Karelia. 
His focus was European revolution and enhancement of the world revolutionary 
movement. Zinoviev was also the head of the Comintern, and his closest contacts 
with the Red Finns seem to be with the St. Petersburg Finns (the Rahja brothers, 
Adolf Taimi, and their circle), who had lived a long time there and were mem-
bers of the Bolshevik party. Karelia belonged in the political sphere of Petrograd 
as did the Olonets party and Soviet organizations. The first party secretary of 
Karelia as well as of the Olonets party organization, Vasili Kudzhiev, was a for-
mer member of the “SR internationalists” before his career in the Bolshevik par-
ty; and his policy followed the Zinoviev line, cold to the national ambitions of 
minority nations. For them Karelian autonomy was a skilful diplomatic maneu-
ver, no longer necessary after the successful Dorpat peace negotiations. World 
revolution would resolve all social and national problems.  
Gylling’s line resembled Stalin’s and Narkomindel’s realpolitik. His idea 
was feasible, and it offered a prospect for peaceful settlement with Karelians and 
Finland. His politics were based on the idea of conciliation to the local Karelian 
population: Gylling saw that the first task was not accelerating a class struggle 
but national reconciliation and modernization of Karelian society. First of all so-
cialism was for him a way to liberate suppressed nations from Tsarist oppres-
sion. This was close to Stalin and Lenin’s nationalities policy of the 1920s. 
Therefore it was logical that Gylling and Commissar of Nationalities Stalin 
agreed on how to resolve the Karelian question. It was no less surprising that the 
Red Army was suspicious of the autonomy of Karelia and Narkomindel was in 
favor of it. The Red Army had good reasons to be on the alert for Finnish “na-
tionalism” and Finland’s military activities directed towards the Murmansk rail-
way. Narkomindel’s main interest was to stabilize the international situation and 
secure the position of Soviet Russia. Finland’s role was crucial to Russia’s west-
ern border, and therefore Narkomindel agreed that the peace treaty with Finland 
was a key factor in stabilizing the whole Baltic Sea region. Without an agree-
ment on Karelia between Russia and Finland, there would be no stability in the 
region. At this stage Russia needed breathing space. There was no other alterna-
tive to a political and diplomatic solution in Karelia. Karelia obtained autonomy 
and a red émigré Gylling the position of prime minister of the Karelian Workers’ 
Commune instead of imprisonment in Finland or interminable exile in Sweden. 
The irony of history is that although Gylling and his comrades lost the civil war 
of 1918, they won Karelia which the victorious White Finns had so furiously 
fought for.  
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to establish Finnish newspapers and schools in North Karelia.17 The political sit-
uation was under the control of neither Soviet nor any other authorities, and the 
Onega Karelians resisted more or less all external attempts to control their areas. 
The other agency working in Karelia was The Executive Committee (EC) of  
Olonets uezd. It was a tool of the Petrograd party committee and received its di-
rective from Smolny. The EC of Olonets uezd represented official Soviet power 
in Karelia, but it lacked influence over most of northern Karelia. However lim-
ited its control, the EC had elected the organizational committees to prepare for 
the first assembly of the All-Karelian Congress of Soviets. This organizational 
committee held its first meeting on April 23, 1920, the day before the Soviet del-
egation walked out of the Rajajoki negotiations.18 
The EC of Olonets then asked the Revolutionary Committee of Petrograd 
whether 
 
zavodsk,” and the representative of the German Workers’ Commune.21 The deci-
sion regarding the Karelian Commune had been made taking foreign policy into 
account, and after that decisions on the Karelian question were made on the basis 
of foreign policy. Another important consequence of this decision was that the 
EC of Olonets and Petrograd were ignored and the seeds of rivalry between Red 
Finns backed by Moscow and the EC of Olonets backed by Petrograd were 
sown. 
 
In Karelia.23 Three days later, on May 27, the committee had done its work and 
Narkomindel and Yrjö Sirola, chairman of the Communist Party of Finland, ap-
proved Vladimirsk’s resolution. It was ready for presentation to the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee (VTsIK).24 
Finland accepted the Soviet offer of peace negotiations on the same day. The 
peace negotiations in Dorpat would start on June 10, 1920. Soviet authorities 
had a busy timetable. They had to sort out the Karelia issue prior to the Dorpat 
negotiations 
 
of the Olonets organization committee for the All-Karelian Congress.26 As a re-
sult, two separate Soviet organizations intended to settle the Karelian question in 
their own way. 
 
mittee of Karelia one week later. The Finnish members were Gylling and the be-
fore mentioned Jaakko Mäki.28 The activities of the Olonets committee provide 
clear evidence that there was disagreement over the composition of the Karelian 
(Revolutionary) Committee. The clash of the competing institutions and their in-
terests were crystallizing in the nomination process and parallel, but contradicto-
ry activities of the Moscow based and Petrograd based organizations.  
There were now two competing committees in Karelia, one appointed by the 
Orgburo and one appointed by the Olonets party leadership. It is evident that the 
organization 
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range. The institutional and political struggle within the Soviet leadership was 
mirrored in Karelia. The Revkom, led by Gylling and nominated by the VKP (b) 
Orgburo competed with the Olonets organizational committee led by Kudzhiev 
and supported by the Petrograd party organizations. 
Events thus went forward on two tracks. The Olonets EC next named its own 
leadership for the All-Karelian Congress, disregarding the activities of Gylling’s 
Revkom. 
 
gress of the Karelian Workers’ Commune.30 Narkomidel was committed to the 
“Gylling-Vladimirsk” plan for Karelian autonomy and saw that its realization 
was a key factor in reaching positive results in the ongoing Dorpat peace negoti-
ations with Finland. Moscow did not have the slightest intention of letting locals 
confuse its diplomatic maneuvers. 
 
Commune. Following initial discussions the negotiations did not advance until 
the Red Army defeated Poland in July. This event, along with the Soviet-Lettish 
( 
a question of class struggle. He compared the Karelian issue to the Bolshevik 
policy among the “Eastern nations” of Soviet Russia where the first task was na-
tional and cultural emancipation of Muslim nations – not a class struggle as in 
the European part of Russia. It is worth noting that when Gylling described the 
Commune 
and separate Karelia from Russia.55 Here is another example of the disagreement 
among the Bolsheviks about the essence of the Soviet Union (autonomy vs. a 
federation of republics) and expectations of revolutionary developments in Eu-
rope. Among the Red Finns the disagreement focused on the position of Finno-
Ugric nations in Russia after the revolution. From this standpoint the accusations 
of Adolf Taimi were “right” and disagreement between his and Gylling’s politi-
cal opinion real. 
After the session of the Orgburo, it was time to purge the Northwest Bureau 
which had backed the opponents of Gylling and the Karelian party organization. 
Ivan 
ter, language, or cultural orientation. On the whole, the arrangements in Karelia 
followed the general line of Soviet politics based on economics; and Gylling, 
having a good understanding of economics, understood this. He did not therefore 
oppose the territorial arrangements as fiercely as some other national mi9nded 
Red Finns. For Gylling, both a viable economy and the balance between the Rus-
sian and non-Russian national populations were essential preconditions for Kare-
lian autonomy. 
In sum, we can confirm that the most important reasons for creating the au-
tonomous Karelian Workers’ Commune consisted of the following: the existence 
of the strategic Murmansk railway, the proximity of the region to Finland with its 
national dimension, and the Dorpat Peace Agreement in 1920. If Russia wanted 
to preserve a peaceful settlement of the northwest border after the civil war, it 
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had to give autonomy to the Karelian people and abide by the decisions of the 
Treaty of Dorpat on East Karelian autonomy. 
The domestic situation was more complicated. Contradictions were sharp 
both among the central authorities and among the locals in Karelia. Leningrad 
party leaders and Politburo member Grigori Zinoviev represented a common 
“anti-nationalities” or “internationalist” line which did not pay much attention to 
the intentions of minority nations whether it was a question of Ukraine or Kare-
lia. His focus was European revolution and enhancement of the world revolu-
tionary movement. Zinoviev was also the head of the Comintern, and his closest 
contacts with the Red Finns seem to be with the St. Petersburg Finns (the Rahja 
brothers, Adolf Taimi, and their circle), who had lived a long time there and 
were members of the Bolshevik party. Karelia belonged in the political sphere of 
Petrograd as did the Olonets party and Soviet organizations. The first party sec-
retary of Karelia as well as of the Olonets party and Soviet organizations, Vasili 
Kudzhiev, was a former member of the “SR internationalists” before his career 
in the Bolshevik party; and his policy followed the Zinoviev line, cold to the na-
tional ambitions of minority nations. For them Karelian autonomy was a skillful 
diplomatic maneuver, no longer necessary after the successful Dorpat peace ne-
gotiations. World revolution would resolve all social and national problems. 
Gylling’s line resembled Stalin’s and Narkomindel’s realpolitik. His idea 
was feasible, and it offered a prospect for peaceful settlement with Karelians and 
Finland. His politics were based on the idea of conciliation to the local Karelian 
population: Gylling saw that the first task was not accelerating a class struggle 
but national reconciliation and modernization of Karelian society. First of all so-
cialism was for him a way to liberate suppressed nations from Tsarist oppres-
sion. This was close to Stalin’s and Lenin’s nationalities policy of the 1920s. 
Therefore it was logical that Gylling and Commissar of Nationalities Stalin 
agreed on how to resolve the Karelian question. It was no less surprising that the 
Red Army was suspicious of the autonomy of Karelia and Narkomindel was in 
favor of it. The Red Army had good reasons to be on the alert for Finnish “na-
tionalism” and Finland’s military activities directed towards the Murmansk rail-
way. Narkomindel’s main interest was to stabilize the international situation and 
secure the position of Soviet Russia. Finland’s role was crucial to Russia’s west-
ern border, and therefore Narkomindel agreed that the peace treaty with Finland 
was a key factor in stabilizing the whole Baltic Sea region. Without an agree-
ment on Karelia between Russia and Finland, there would be no stability in the 
region. At this stage Russia needed breathing space. There was no other alterna-
tive to a political and diplomatic solution in Karelia. Karelia obtained autonomy 
and a Red émigré Gylling the position of prime minister of the Karelian Work-
ers’ Commune instead of imprisonment in Finland or interminable exile in Swe-
den. The irony of history is that although Gylling and his comrades lost the civil 
war of 1918, they won Karelia which the victorious White Finns had so fiercely 
fought for. 
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